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Introduction	
Civil	 society	 activism	 has	 been	 considered	 one	 of	 the	 key	 shaping	 factors	 of	
contemporary	 cities	 (Castells,	 1983),	 particularly	 in	 a	 context	 in	 which	 urbanisation	
pressures	and	exclusionary	urban	development	practice	have	resulted	in	the	emergence	
of	massive	poverty-ridden	informal	settlements.	Although	the	span	of	these	activities	is	
vast	and	difficult	to	describe	in	a	linear	manner,	one	of	the	strains	of	the	current	debate	
captures	 these	 processes	 through	 the	 concept	 of	 social	 movement-initiated	 co-
production	 (Watson,	 2014).	 The	 concept	 expands	 the	 traditional	 definitions	 that	
consider	 co-production	 mainly	 as	 a	 way	 to	 share	 resources	 and	 efforts	 by	 the	
representatives	of	different	sectors	engaged	in	a	common	project	(Ostrom,	1996).	These	
early	 conceptualisations	 identify	 co-production	 as	 a	way	 to	 facilitate	 service	 delivery	
and	 as	 a	 mechanism	 to	 reorder	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 public	 sector	 and	 the	
citizens.	The	current	debate	goes	a	step	 further	by	positioning	co-production	as	a	key	
factor	that	leads	to	a	broader	change	in	urban	governance	structures.	Rather	than	only	
focusing	on	project-based	matters,	co-productive	interventions	are	identified	as	having	
the	potential	for	institutional	restructuring	and	as	a	way	to	integrate	various	voices	in	
the	 development	 process.	 This	 line	 of	 thought	 is	 amplified	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 urban	
transformation	 in	 the	 South	 (Watson,	 2014),	 where	 co-production	 is	 considered	 an	
approach	 towards	which	urban	poor	groups	consciously	steer	with	 the	expectation	of	
gaining	 wider	 control	 over	 the	 development	 process,	 accessing	 support	 from	
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governments	 and	 bettering	 their	 position	 in	 the	 urban	 governance	 spectrum	 (Mitlin,	
2008).	In	other	words,	these	actors	try	to	scale	up	the	co-productive	approach	with	the	
intention	of	achieving	“far-reaching	change”	(Mitlin	&	Bartlett,	2018,	p.	363).	Within	a	
variety	 of	 often	 contradictory	 definitions	 (Brandsen	 &	 Honingh,	 2016)	 and	 a	 highly	
contextualised	 application	of	 co-production	 (Environment	&	Urbanization,	 2018),	 this	
ambition	of	urban	movements	 is	described	as	one	of	 the	key	 features	of	 the	approach	
(Watson	 2014;	Mitlin	&	 Bartlett	 2018).	 However,	with	 the	 predominant	 focus	 on	 the	
description	 of	 influential	 factors	 of	 co-production	 rather	 than	 on	 their	 outcomes	
(Voorberg,	Bekkers	&	Tummers,	2015),	as	well	as	a	focus	on	small-scale	project-based	
case	studies,	reflection	on	the	broader	governance	change	process	and	outcomes,	which	
co-production	is	supposed	to	instigate,	is	largely	missing	in	the	literature.		
The	aim	of	this	article	is	to	reflect	on	such	a	context	and	to	analyse	the	process	of	
governance	 change	 originated	 and	 steered	 by	 the	 urban	 poor	 sector	 as	 well	 as	 the	
outcomes	 of	 this	 process	 in	 terms	 of	 policy	 environment	 and	 practice.	 This	 is	 done	
through	an	analysis	of	the	two-phased	engagement	of	the	Urban	Poor	Alliance	(UP-ALL)	
with	the	urban	governance	of	Metro	Manila,	and	their	role	as	co-producers	of	a	major	
resettlement	 programme	Oplan	 LIKAS	 (2011-2016)	 aiming	 at	 relocation	 and	 housing	
development	for	approximately	120,000	informal	settler	families	(ISFs)	living	in	flood-
prone	 areas.	 The	 first	 phase	 involves	 efforts	 to	 widen	 access	 to	 governance	 and	 is	
identified	 here	 as	 the	 ‘scaling	 up’	 phase.	 The	 second,	 	 ‘governance/implementation’,	
phase	 involves	 the	 execution	 of	 the	 new	 position.	 Phase	 one	 includes	 the	 non-linear	
engagement	of	various	organisations,	which	gradually	advanced	their	position	through	
decades	 of	 bottom-up	work	 based,	 to	 a	major	 degree,	 on	 principles	 of	 co-production.	
Building	 on	 these	 activities	 and	 the	 networking	 efforts	 of	 different	 groups,	 a	 major	
coalition	of	urban	poor	 -	 the	Urban	Poor	Alliance	 (UP-ALL)	 -	was	established	 in	2005	
and	progressively	achieved	a	greater	impact	on	policy	making	matters	(Karaos	&	Porio,	
2005).	The	second	phase	analysed	in	this	article	commenced	in	2010,	when	the	UP-ALL	
signed	 a	10-point	 covenant	with	 then	presidential	 candidate	Benigno	Aquino	 III,	who	
recognised	the	main	housing	policy	demands	of	the	alliance,	including	the	landmark	co-
productive	 approach	 of	 the	 People’s	 Plans,	 and	 its	 embedding	 in	 the	 Oplan	 LIKAS	
programme.			
The	article	reviews	the	strategies	of	one	of	the	major	urban	poor	movements	in	
Metro	Manila	which	 led	 them	 to	 this	position,	 as	well	 as	 the	outcomes	of	 attempts	 to	
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scale	up	the	co-productive	approach	of	the	People’s	Plans	and	in-city	relocation	as	the	
policy	 of	 choice	 in	 low-income	 housing	 programmes	 in	 Metro	 Manila.	 As	 such,	 in	
theoretical	 terms,	 the	 article	 critically	 contributes	 to	 the	 current	 debate	 on	 co-
production	of	governance	and	reflects	on	the	characteristics,	prospects	and	limits	of	the	
approach	 beyond	 a	 project	 scale.	 By	 doing	 so	 it	 reflects	 on	 the	 broader	 premise	 of	
forming	 alternative	modalities	 of	 engagement	between	 the	 state	 and	 society.	 In	 other	
words,	it	asks	to	what	extent	the	engagement,	broadly	defined	as	co-production,	enables	
the	 formulation	 and	 embedding	 of	 inclusion	 mechanisms	 within	 the	 governance	
structures	 dominated	 by	 public	 sector	 and	 oriented	 towards	 the	 private	 sector’s	
interests.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	 article	 contributes	 to	 the	 debate	 on	 urban	 governance	
transformation	 through	 sharpening	 a	 theoretical	 understanding	 of	 co-production	 and	
identifying	the	conditions	that	such	an	approach	would	structure	“planning	and	urban	
development	processes	in	certain	Global	South	contexts”	(Watson,	2014,	p.	63).	Lastly,	it	
tests	 the	 analytical	 approach	 (Galuszka,	 2019)	 towards	 tracing	 the	 hidden	 dynamic	
underlying	 civil	 society–state	 engagement	 within	 the	 context	 of	 an	 exclusionary	
governance	setting.		
Co-production	–	Primary	Concepts	
The	first	studies	of	co-production	were	carried	out	in	North	America	and	the	UK	
in	 the	 1970s	 and	 were	 undertaken	 within	 the	 Economics	 and	 Public	 Management	
disciplines.	Initially		their	main	focus	was	on	the	reduction	of	service	delivery	costs	and	
the	increased	efficiency	that	resulted	from	the	sharing	of	responsibilities	and	resources	
by	the	public	sector	and	citizens	involved	in	the	implementation	of	a	common	project.	
The	 aspect	 involving	 the	 creation	of	 new	 types	of	 relationships	between	 the	 involved	
parties	resonated	more	strongly	in	the	following	decades	with	the	recognition	that	co-
production	 can	 serve	 as	 a	 relevant	 tool	 to	 reorder	 the	 relationship	 between	 urban	
dwellers	and	power	holders.	While	some	authors	positioned	this	effect	as	an	instrument	
enabling	 negotiations	 of	 regulations	 and	 norms	 by	 citizens	 (Bovaird,	 2007),	 others	
identified	 it	 as	 an	 approach	 which	 provides	 an	 opening	 for	 more	 substantial	 change	
through	the	sharing	of	power	and	inputs	in	the	service	delivery	process	(Mitlin,	2008;	
Watson	 2014)	 and	 policy-making	 (Whitaker,	 1980).	 This	 line	 of	 thought	 resonated	
mainly	 in	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 urban	 transformation	 of	 the	 South,	 where	 informal	
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urbanisation	 remained	a	dominant	 (and	often	 the	only	 available)	housing	mechanism	
for	 the	 urban	 poor.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 their	 engagement	 with	 service	 delivery	 was	
beneficial	 in	 that	 it	 helped	 communities	 to	 internally	 build	 strong	 and	 independent	
grassroots	 organisations	 (Mitlin,	 2008)	 through	 fostering	 the	 need	 to	 federate	 and	
engage	in	collective	action	(Appadurai,	2001).	On	the	other	hand,	activities	like	mapping	
(Watson,	 2014),	 enumeration	 (Patel,	 Baptist	&	 d’Cruz,	 2012),	 saving	 schemes	 (Mitlin,	
2008;	 Archer,	 2012)	 and	 microfinance	 (McFarlane,	 2012a),	 translated	 to	 creation	 of	
own	 financial	 base	 and	 knowledge	 base	 which	 helps	 challenging	 existing	 power	
relations	 (Jasanoff,	 2004)	 and,	 in	 effect,	 recalibrating	 the	 strategies	 of	 the	 authorities	
(Roy,	 2009a).	 As	 a	 consequence,	 an	 enhancement	 of	 the	 negotiating	 potential	 of	 the	
communities	 and	 a	 strengthening	 of	 their	 position,	 vis-à-vis	 the	 state,	was	 identified,	
including	 the	 opportunity	 to	 challenge	 the	 conventional	 modes	 of	 service	 delivery.	
Thanks	 to	 these	 features,	 the	 approach	 was	 applied	 as	 a	 deliberate	 strategy	 by	 the	
urban	 poor,	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 shifting	 the	 power	 structures	 and	 attaining	 wider	
responsibility	for	the	planning	and	delivery	of	developmental	goods	(Boonyabancha	&	
Kerr,	 2018).	 From	 the	 public	 sector	 point	 of	 view,	 this	 approach	 remained	 attractive	
because	it	allowed	for	increased	service	delivery,	access	to	information	and	the	design	
of	better	urban	solutions.	This	 is	particularly	relevant	 in	the	context	of	 informal	areas	
where	some	well-established	developmental	models	might	not	work	(Brown-Luthango	
&	 Reyes,	 2018).	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 face	 of	 declining	 traditional	 registration	
mechanisms,	 community-led	 enumeration	 helped	 the	 public	 sector	 to	 understand	 the	
actual	number	of	people	living	in	informal	settlements	and	to	plan	better	interventions.	
At	the	same	time,	the	clear	benefits	of	the	co-productive	approach	are	not	accepted	by	
all	 public	 sector	 actors.	 Conflicting	 rationalities	 (Watson,	 2003)	 and	 the	 general	
unwillingness	 of	 authorities	 to	 share	 power	 equally	 (Papeleras,	 Bagotlo	 &	
Boonyabancha,	2012)	mean	that	co-production	can	typically	flourish	in	a	context	where	
the	public	sector	is	eager	to	experiment,	where	formal	solutions	have	failed	and	where	
the	 long-term	 relationship	 and	 a	 track	 record	 of	 successful	 interventions	 incentivises	
them	to	work	with	the	communities	(Mitlin	&	Satterthwaite,	2004).	This	worked	in	the	
favour	of	those	communities	who	were	able	to	establish	long-term	leadership,	with	the	
capacity	 to	 generate	 critical-mass	 support	 or	 to	 navigate	 intra-community	 dynamics	
towards	 the	 expected	 outcome	 (Patel,	 2013;	 Galuszka,	 2014)	while	 not	 always	 being	
responsive	to	the	needs	of	all	community	members	(Rigon,	2014)	and	pre-determined	
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by	 the	 existence	 of	 social	 capital	 (Voorberg	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 In	 more	 weakly	 organised	
communities	 this	meant	 that	 a	 key	 role	was	played	by	NGOs	acting	 as	 intermediaries	
between	 the	 authorities	 and	 the	 communities.	 Hence,	 in	 such	 contexts,	 the	 service	
delivery	 arrangement	 and	 cooperation	 format	 was	 also	 dependent	 on	 the	 wider	
positioning	of	an	NGO	within	the	local	political	and	development	aid	structures	and	so	
on	(Banks,	Hulme	&	Edwards,	2015).	Although,	subjected	to	those	complex	community	
and	 political	 dynamics	 (Pieterse,	 2008),	 as	 pointed	 out	 by	 Watson	 (2014),	 co-
production	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 counteract	 some	 of	 the	 main	 disadvantages	 of	 more	
established	 forms	 of	 participatory	 development,	 including	 the	 risk	 of	 co-option	 of	
independent	movements	 and	 issues	 related	 to	 the	 creation	of	 artificial	 representative	
structures	(Cooke	&	Kothari,	2001;	Cornwall,	2004;	Swyngedouw	2005;	Miraftab,	2009;	
Lemansky,	 2017).	 Apart	 from	 the	 scaling	 up	 approach	 and	 the	 ‘showing	 by	 doing’	
strategy,	 this	 was	 achieved	 by	 enabling	 the	 mainstreaming	 of	 approaches	 of	 civil	
societies	which	did	not	fit	into	existing	regulatory	frameworks.	Furthermore,	it	allowed	
control	of	 the	development	process	to	move	beyond	mere	consultation	of	ready-made	
solutions	and	enabled	participation	in	a	diversity	of	activities	such	as	co-financing,	co-
management,	 co-implementation	 etc.	 (Watson,	 2014;	 Bovaird,	 2007).	 This	 was	 often	
forged	 through	 a	more	 conflict-ridden	process	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 classical	 participatory	
governance	setting	(Albrechts,	2013;	Galuszka,	2019).		
Co-production	of	Governance	
Given	 its	 transformative	 potential,	 co-production	 has	 been	 increasingly	
discussed	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 stimulating	 transitions	 in	 the	 way	 cities	 are	 governed.	 The	
creation	 of	 multi-stakeholder	 spaces	 through	 a	 co-productive	 approach	 is	 seen	 as	 a	
means	 to	 foster	 a	 new	 policy	 formulation	 environment	 (Frantzeskaki	 &	 Rok,	 2018),	
bringing	a	change	in	the	way	decisions	are	made	(Wyborn,	2015).	In	spite	of	its	deeply	
decentralised	 character,	 particularly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 precarious	 settlements,	 the	
approach	resonated	beyond	small-scale	neighbourhood	or	district	level	scenarios.	Wide	
international	 recognition	of	 the	power	and	 influence	of	networks	such	as	Slum/Shack	
Dwellers	International	(SDI)	and	the	Asian	Coalition	of	Housing	Rights	(ACHR)	(Herrle,	
Ley	&	Fokdal,	 2015;	Watson	2014;	Bradlow,	2015a),	which	grew	 from	 the	bottom-up	
work	 of	 regional	 affiliates,	 reinforced	 the	 ambition	 to	 scale	 up	 and	 mainstream	 co-
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productive	 solutions	 on	 a	 wider	 city	 scale	 (Mitlin	 &	 Bartlett,	 2018).	 An	 increasing	
interest	 in	 the	 literature	 dealing	 with	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 informal	 sector	 affects	
urban	governance	(Sermiento	&	Tilly,	2018)	translated	into	an	analysis	of	the	impacts	
on	 governance	 of	 co-production	 in	 the	 South.	 In	 the	 early	 2000s,	 Joshi	 and	 Moore	
(2004)	identified	logistical	as	well	as	governance	drivers	of	the	approach,	with	the	latter	
being	 primarily	 directed	 at	 addressing	 governance	 capacities	 of	 the	 state.	 A	 range	 of	
authors	 (Ackerman,	 2004;	 Brandsen	 &	 Pestoff,	 2006;	 Bovaird,	 2007)	 reinforced	 the	
distinction	between	different	levels	of	co-production,	while	underscoring	the	potential	
impact	 of	 citizens	 on	 policy	 making	 and	 governance,	 for	 instance	 through	 co-
management	 or	 co-governance.	 However,	 most	 of	 these	 interpretations,	 mainly	
originating	from	the	Northern	context,	supported	the	view	that	the	process	needs	to	be	
driven	by	a	public	sector	proponent	and	should	include	regulatory	mechanisms	such	as	
institutionalisation	 and	 fixed	 frameworks	 ensuring	 sustainability	 of	 the	 arrangement.	
The	 applicability	 of	 these	 assumptions	was	 questioned	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 governance	
transformation,	particularly	in	the	context	of	the	South.	In	particular,	the	positioning	of	
the	 co-productive	 process	 as	 external	 to	 community	 groups	 or	 as	 an	 invited	 space	 of	
participation	 (Cornwall,	 2004)	 was	 identified	 as	 bearing	 a	 similar	 risk	 as	 the	
aforementioned	 participatory	 schemes	 (Richardson	 et	 al.,	 2018)	 or	 as	 a	 mechanism	
having	 limited	 impact	 on	 the	 policy	 change	 process	 (Galuszka,	 2019).	 As	 previously	
mentioned,	 the	 creation	 of	 openings	 for	 communities	 to	 be	 included	 in	 governance	
choices	rather	than	only	in	co-implementation	remains	crucial	here	if	the	people	are	not	
to	 be	 relegated	 to	 a	 role	 in	mere	 service	 delivery	 (Mitlin	 &	 Bartlett,	 2018).	 This	 risk	
remains	real	as	governments	may	find	it	both	attractive	and	practical	to	“offload	service	
delivery	to	NGOs	and	community	groups	or	convince	local	residents	to	donate	volunteer	
labor	or	materials”	(Ackerman,	2012,	p.	102).	Access	to	governance,	except	with	regard	
to	 the	 scaling	 up	 of	 the	 solutions	 of	 urban	 groups	 and	movements	 (Mitlin	 &	 Bartlett	
2018),	has	the	benefit	of	 increasing	the	accountability	of	 the	public	sector	(Ackerman,	
2004)	 and	 enabling	 the	 self-positioning	 of	 citizens	 vis-à-vis	 the	 state.	 Yet,	 the	way	 in	
which	 this	 access	 is	 achieved	 appears	 to	 be	 equally	 crucial	 in	 the	 context	 of	 urban	
change	 in	 the	South.	For	 instance,	 some	 initial	 reports	 suggest	 that	 co-production	can	
have	equally	empowering	and	disempowering	effects	(Moretto	et	al.,	2018)	and	can	be	
contested	 by	 authorities	when	 attempting	 to	 scale	 up	 (see	 Chitekwe-Biti,	 2018).	 This	
risk	 resonates	 at	 higher	 governance	 levels.	 In	 fact,	 even	 when	 co-production	 is	
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embedded	 in	governance	systems,	but	not	steered	by	grassroots,	 as	 in	 the	case	of	 the	
land	delivery	system	in	Ghana,	the	arrangement	may	have	exclusionary	impacts	on	the	
general	 population	 (Akaateba,	 Huang	 &	 Adumpo,	 2018).	 For	 these	 reasons	 the	
understanding	of	co-production	adapted	in	this	article	builds	on	the	central	assumption	
that	the	organised	communities,	rather	than	the	public	sector,	need	to	drive	the	process	
(Boonyabancha	&	 Kerr,	 2018)	 and	 that	 their	 involvement	 extends	 beyond	 one	 single	
phase	 of	 a	 project.	 That	 involvement	 should	 impact	 on	 the	 design,	 management	 and	
execution	of	the	process.	Consequently,	the	analysed	approach	of	this	article	is	defined	
as	co-production	of	governance	which	is	an	“open-ended	process	that	enables	the	urban	
poor	 to	 continuously	 affect,	 review	 and	 update	 policies	within	 or	 outside	 of	 formally	
recognised	bodies”	(Galuszka,	2019,	p.	150),	while	bearing	 in	mind‚	 that	 the	 impact	of	
organised	 groups	 of	 citizens	 on	 governance	 should	 “mirror	 their	 own	 protocols	 and	
safeguard	 principles	 of	 flexibility	 and	 collective	 action”	 (Galuszka,	 2019,	 p.	 150).	 The	
methodological	 considerations	 for	 inquiring	 into	 the	 nature	 of	 such	 a	 process	 are	
described	in	the	following	section.	
Analytical	Framework	and	Methods	
The	 first	major	aim	of	 this	article	 is	to	trace	 the	process	of	governance	 transformation	
instigated	 by	 the	 grassroots	through	 a	 co-productive	 approach	with	 the	 intention	 of	
scaling	it	up	as	the	main	solution	for	housing	the	poor	in	Metro	Manila.	Two	phases	of	
the	engagement	are	identified	and	analysed:	the	first	is	the	scaling	up	phase,	the	second	
is	 the	governance/implementation	phase.	The	 first	phase	 is	described	 in	 terms	of	 the	
variety	of	approaches	that	led	to	governance	change.	Its	outcomes	are	evaluated	based	
on	 the	capacity	 to	attain	 the	goals	set	out	by	 the	UP-ALL	and	the	achievement	of	new	
positioning	within	the	housing	governance	structures	in	Metro	Manila.	The	analysis	of	
the	second	phase	and	its	outcomes,	as	previously	stated,	is	conducted	beyond	a	project-
level	 context.	 Consequently,	 rather	 than	 looking	 at	 specific	 projects	 realised	 within	
Oplan	 LIKAS	 (which	 have	 taken	 very	 different	 trajectories	 based	 on	 specific	 location,	
involved	 intermediaries,	 etc.),	 the	 article	 is	 concerned	 with	 the	 overall	 effects	 on	
governance	 and	 the	 actual	 integration	 of	 the	 co-productive	 approach	 of	 the	 People’s	
Plans	and	the	governance	factors	which	shaped	the	implementation	of	the	programme.	
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The	 second	 major	 aim	 of	 the	 article	 is	 to	 deepen	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	
process	 of	 co-production	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 South.	 I	 argue	 that	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	
local	 specifics	 of	 the	 governance	 process	 is	 necessary	 to	 grasp	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	
achievements	of	the	UP-ALL	in	the	scaling	up	phase	and	the	failures	of	the	arrangement	
in	 the	 governance/implementation	 phase.	 That	 is,	 this	 study	 goes	 beyond	 the	
assumptions	underpinning	the	successes	of	co-production	and	its	governance	effects	in	
the	European	and	North	American	contexts	and	seeks	to	understand	relations,	factors	of	
change	and	outcomes	of	governance	process	 transformation	 in	a	 complex	governance	
system	 that	 is	 decentralised	 but	 dependent	 on	 political	 leaders,	 and	 that	 incentivises	
bottom-up	work	but	also	undermines	and	co-opts	it	(Shatkin,	2007;	Hutchison,	2007).	
	In	particular,	it	reflects	on	three	key	issues	that	are	considered	to	distinguish	the	
co-productive	process	in	different	settings	and	intellectual	traditions	and	are	proposed	
as	 a	 guideline	 for	 analysing	 the	 governance	 change	 process	 in	 the	 South	 (Galuszka,	
2019).	These	are:		
- Positioning	of	the	institutionalisation	of	a	participatory	space	as	a	precondition	for	its
sustainability	 (Ackerman,	 2004;	 Joshi	 &	 Moore,	 2004)	 versus	 the	 importance	 of
maintaining	a	degree	of	independence	from	this	space	by	civil	society	(Galuszka,	2019).
Specifically,	 this	 issue	 focuses	 on	 understanding	 to	 what	 degree	 the	 civil	 society	 can
preserve	its	approaches	and	get	them	inscribed	into	law,	although	these	approaches	are
usually	 based	 on	 a	 completely	 different	 developmental	 or	 implementation	 logic,	 and
exist	because	legal	or	regulatory	frameworks	fail	(Watson,	2014).
- How	 cooperation	 and	 conflict	 are	 treated	 and	 what	 resources	 are	 used	 to	 reorder
power	relations	between	citizens	and	 the	state.	This	 includes	 the	consideration	 that	a
combination	of	the	two	is	typical	in	the	South	and	is	usually	required	for	civil	society	to
advance	with	 its	agenda	(Watson,	2014;	Bradlow,	2015b;	Miltin	2018),	particularly	 in
the	scaling	up	phase.	 	Simultaneously,	 this	 issue	poses	 the	question	as	 to	whether	 the
declared	depoliticised	nature	of	some	sectorial-oriented	civil	society	movements	(Dikeç
&	 Swyngedouw,	 2017)	 and	 their	 declared	 non-conflict	 orientation,	 suffice	 to	 affect
urban	governance	on	a	broader	metro	scale.
- Two	 intertwined,	 but	 often	 exclusionary,	 objectives	 of	 civil	 society	 activism:	 control
over	the	development	process	and	redistribution	of	resources	(Galuszka,	2019).	That	is,
this	 issue	reflects	on	 the	notion	of	 co-production	as	a	manifestation	of	 the	neo-liberal
tendency	to	push	service	delivery	responsibility	away	from	the	public	sector	(Miraftab,
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2004)	and	on	the	assumption	that	the	redistribution	of	resources	may	be	 linked	to	an	
increase	 in	 the	 state’s	 control	over	 the	development	process	 (Huchzermeyer,	2003).	 I	
ask	whether	the	civil	society	can	merge	these	two	objectives	and	whether	co-produced	
governance	can	help	the	civil	society	to	achieve	it.		
The	proposed	analytical	device	can	reflect	on	the	hidden	dynamic	underlying	the	
civil	 society	 –	 state	 partnership	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 exclusionary	 governance	 setting.	
While	many	co-productive	approaches	across	the	global	South	are	documented	through	
the	prism	of	lower	project	costs	or	wider	service	delivery,	these	measures	may,	in	fact,	
not	be	the	dominant	factors	for	the	inclusion	or	exclusion	of	specific	solutions	or	groups	
from	a	particular	governance	setting.		The	review	of	the	contradictory	nature	of	the	co-
productive	process	reaches	to	those	‘non-technocratic’	motivators	of	urban	governance	
change,	 and	 aims	 at	 deepening	 the	understanding	of	 the	 governance	processes	 in	 the	
South.		
This	article	draws	on	data	collected	during	fieldwork	conducted	in	Metro	Manila	
between	 November	 2017	 and	 March	 2018,	 including	 interviews,	 site	 visits	 and	 the	
analysis	of	quantitative	and	spatial	data	sourced	from	the	local	shelter	agencies	and	civil	
society	organisations.	Overall,	37	in-depth,	semi-structured	interviews	were	conducted	
(including	 7	 in	 a	 group	 setting).	 The	 selection	 criteria	 for	 the	 interviews	 included	
engagement	 in	 the	 formulation	 and/or	 implementation	 of	 the	 Oplan	 LIKAS.	
Additionally,	 it	 involved	 screening	 for	 representatives	 of	 different	 sectors	 and	
organisations.	These	included	leaders	of	the	UP-ALL	involved	in	the	establishment	and	
implementation	 of	 the	Oplan	LIKAS	 as	well	 as	 	 partner	 community	 organisations	 and	
NGOs1.	 Additionally,	 interviews	 were	 undertaken	 with	 a	 parallel	 urban	 poor	 bloc	
organised	around	 the	 Institute	 for	Popular	Democracy/Kilos	Maralita	which	benefited	
from	a	big	proportion	of	the	funding	delivered	for	in-city	resettlement.		
As	such,	the	research	included	interviews	with	the	two	main	urban	poor	blocs	in	
Metro	Manila	which	engaged	in	co-productive	action:	the	UP-ALL	-	largely	composed	of	
apolitical	or	broadly	pro-democratic	(liberal)	groups	and	Kilos	Maralita	-	 linked	to	the	
left	political	block.	The	remaining	major	network	–	Kadamay	–	 in	principle	rejects	 the	
co-productive	approach	and	orientates	itself	towards	more	radical	measures	including	
1 Such as: TRICOR members: Community Organisers Multiversity, Urban Poor Associates; KOSMA (Coalition 
of People’s Organizations in Manila); CMP Congress members (former representatives of the Foundation for 
the Development of the Urban Poor), Homeless People’s Federation Philippines, DAMPA (Damayan ng 
Maralitang Pilipinong Api), TAO Pilipinas, Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies. 
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housing	 occupation	 and	 land	 invasions2.	 Interviews	were	 also	 conducted	with	 former	
and	 current	 representatives	 of	 the	 public	 sector	 holding	 managerial	 and	 senior	
bureaucratic	positions	 in	 the	main	 implementing	agencies:	 the	Department	of	 Interior	
and	 Local	 Government	 (DILG),	 the	 Social	 Finance	 Housing	 Corporation	 (SHFC),	 the	
National	Housing	Authority	(NHA),	the	Presidential	Commission	for	the	Urban	Poor,	as	
well	 as	 representatives	 of	 the	 Local	 Government	 Units,	 mainly	 at	 the	 level	 of	 Local	
Housing	 Boards.	 Interviews	 were	 also	 conducted	 with	 community	 members	 on	 the	
'implementing/receiving’	end	 in	 three	communities	where	resettlement	projects	were	
either	finalised	or	near	completion,	as	well	as	in	two	communities	in	the	pre-relocation	
stage.		
Inclusive	 Foundations	 and	 Exclusive	 Practices	 in	 Housing	 Governance	 in	Metro	
Manila	
The	urban	poor	movement	has	been	intensively	organised	in	Metro	Manila	since	
the	1970s.	 It	was	originally	composed	of	very	diverse	communities	that	were	brought	
together	 by	 a	 unifying	 anti-eviction	 agenda	 and	 opposition	 to	 the	 repressive	 Marcos	
regime.	 During	 this	 period	 the	 groups	 had	 relatively	 few	 possibilities	 for	 engaging	 in	
governance	 matters	 through	 official	 channels	 and	 tried	 to	 exercise	 their	 influence	
through	politicised	and	confrontational	means	(Shatkin,	2002).	The	change	in	political	
rule	 in	 the	Philippines	 in	1986	and	 the	 adoption	of	 in-depth	decentralisation	 reforms	
significantly	altered	the	nature	of	the	movement	and	the	scope	of	its	activities	(Karaos,	
2006).	Its	function	at	that	time	was	to	benefit	from	enabling	laws,	particularly	the	Local	
Government	 Code	 of	 1991	 and	 the	 Urban	 and	 Development	 Housing	 Act	 (UDHA)	 of	
1992,	which	 devolved	many	 of	 the	 centralised	 powers	 to	 the	 local	 government	 units.	
The	 essence	 of	 these	 new	 laws	 was	 to	 involve	 the	 representatives	 of	 people’s	
organisations,	 community	 groups	 and	NGOs	 in	 the	 development	 process	 by	 changing	
their	 position	 from	 beneficiaries	 to	 key	 stakeholders	 in	 the	 settlement	 upgrading	
process.	 These	 aims	were	manifested	 in	 the	 National	 Shelter	 Programme,	which	was	
linked	to	the	decentralisation	of	housing	production	and	 legitimised	the	state	position	
as	 an	 enabler	 of	 housing	 rather	 than	 its	 provider	 (Ballesteros,	 2002).	 Under	 these	
2 This article employs the term ‘urban poor movement/bloc’ to refer to the two major fractions which support 
engagement in co-productive action and refrain from radical contestation measures.  
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conditions,	 numerous	 urban	 poor	 coalitions	 flourished	 and	 engaged	 actively	 in	 local	
urban	development	matters.	
	However,	 these	 progressive	 foundations	 were	 not	 smoothly	 translated	 into	
inclusive	development	practice,	with	many	of	the	local	elites	from	both	the	government	
and	 the	private	 sector	 acting	 as	 a	 stumbling	block	 in	 the	 implementation	of	 pro-poor	
policies	 (Shatkin,	2007).	The	roots	of	 this	dichotomy,	which	 is	also	 linked	 to	practical	
reasons	 such	 as	 competition	 for	 land	 and	 profit,	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 “ideological	
currents	 operating	 through	 local	 real-estate	 markets”	 (Garrido,	 2013,	 p.	 167).	 The	
preference	of	elite	consumers	 for	exclusive	spaces	and	the	related	routine	of	planning	
practice	 remained	 in	 contrast	 to	 such	policies	 as	 securing	 in-city	 land	 for	 low-income	
populations	 and	 the	 development	 of	 social	 housing.	 In	 practice,	 this	 kind	 of	 “off-the-
scene”	 resistance	 of	 power	 holders	 was	 reinforced	 by	 the	 merging	 of	 political	 and	
economic	elites	(Kleibert,	2018)	and	manifested	itself	in	a	variety	of	ways,	ranging	from	
negligent	implementation	of	progressive	policies	to	the	difficulty	of	transforming	public	
institutions	(Constantino-David,	2004).	Likewise,	even	though	innovative	participatory	
mechanisms	had	been	established,	the	outputs	of	these	spaces	still	largely	depended	on	
the	 willingness	 of	 top	 decision	 makers.	 In	 her	 analysis	 of	 networked	 governance	
practices	 in	 two	 cities	 in	Metro	Manila,	 Porio	 (2012)	documents	 that	decentralisation	
may	have	transformed	the	traditional	bureaucratic	structures	but	at	the	same	time	was	
used	by	mayors	to	reinforce	their	control	over	the	development	process.	The	range	of	
strategies	 involved	not	only	the	creation	of	alliances	and	networks	supportive	of	their	
agenda,	 but	 also	 actions	 that	 are	 conventionally	 considered	 to	 support	 co-production	
(Joshie	&	Moore,	2004),	namely	 the	 institutionalisation	of	 regulatory	 frameworks	and	
practices.	 This	 finding	 is	 confirmed	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 community-based	
organisations.	When	building	relationships	with	a	multitude	of	‘formal’	actors,	including	
donors	and	government	officials,	these	actors	tend	to	attempt	to	maintain	control	of	the	
development	process	rather	than	share	it	equally	(Papeleras	et	al.,	2012).		
The	 issue	 also	 relates	 to	 the	 aspect	 of	 financing.	 The	 openings	 offered	 by	 the	
political	 transformation	 did	 not	 result	 in	 increased	 access	 to	 state	 resources	 and	
“protection	as	a	justifiable	right”	but	rather	in	the	creation	of	spaces	for	bargaining	for	
access	 to	 services	 and	 resources	 (Hutchison,	 2007;	 Shatkin,	 2002).	 As	 much	 as	
decentralisation	 has	 resulted	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 an	 active	 civil	 society	 to	 date,	 the	
budget	 for	 housing	 has	 remained	marginal	 for	 decades.	 In	 the	 years	 2000–2007,	 the	
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Philippines	invested	the	least	money	on	average	on	low-income	housing	compared	with	
other	 South-East	 Asian	 countries	 (Habito,	 2009).	 Unsurprisingly,	 the	 issue	 of	
substandard	 housing	 conditions	 is	 nowhere	 near	 being	 resolved.	 Out	 of	 the	
approximately	13	million	people	living	in	Metro	Manila,	between	1.3	and	3	million	are	
estimated	to	live	in	informal	settlements	(World	Bank,	2016).	
This	 paradoxical	 positioning	 of	 the	 urban	poor	 and	 inclusive	 policies	 has	 been	
reflected	 in	 the	 local,	 public	 sector-led	 housing	 and	 tenure-focused	 programmes.	 A	
study	of	 the	overall	number	of	assisted	 informal	settler	 families	 from	Metro	Manila	 in	
the	last	decade	reveals	that	the	progressive	solutions	based	on	co-production	principles	
benefited	 only	 a	 small	 number	 of	 people	 in	 comparison	 with	 top-down	 resettlement	
schemes	 delivered	 by	 developers.	 For	 example,	 the	 Community	 Mortgage	 Program,	
which	positions	communities	in	the	centre	of	the	land	formalisation	process,	benefited	
26,480	 households	 between	 2005	 and	 2011.	 From	 2005	 to	 2010,	 the	 resettlement	
programme	 delivered	 107,079	 housing	 units	 (Galuszka,	 2014).	 Consequently,	 the	
overwhelming	 majority	 of	 the	 low-income	 housing	 produced	 in	 Metro	 Manila	 and	
surrounding	area	 is	 linked	 to	 the	most	 contested	 format	of	development,	namely,	 off-
city	relocation,	which	means	people	receive	“little	boxes	on	tiny	resettlement	plots	in	a	
vast	grid	development	designed	by	NHA3	engineers	and	built	expensively	by	contractor”	
(Papeleras,	et	al.,	2012,	p.	474).	
The	Scaling	Up	Phase:	the	UP-ALL	and	the	10-Point	Covenant	
Given	 the	 limited	 reach	 of	 innovative	 solutions	 and	 the	 perpetual	 housing	
shortage,	 efforts	 to	 find	 solutions	 towards	 a	wider	 inclusion	of	 the	urban	poor	 in	 the	
housing	 sector	 continued.	 In	 response	 to	 the	 forced	 relocations	 happening	 around	
Metro	Manila	(Mabilin,	2014),	many	of	these	activities	were	in	the	past	steered	by	anti-
eviction	 groups.	 Even	 before	 1986,	 there	 were	 strong	 movements	 that	 utilised	
networking	mechanisms	with	the	intent	to	challenge	official	policies.	One	of	the	largest	
networks	of	this	time,	the	Zone	One	Tondo	Organisation	(and	its	umbrella	organisation	-	
Ungayan),	 emerged	 as	 a	 relatively	 strong	 grouping	 utilising	 politicised	 and	
confrontational	 tactics	 and	 organised	 around	 an	 anti-eviction	 agenda.	 The	 group	
3 NHA: The National Housing Authority is the main housing agency mandated to provide housing for relocated 
families in the Philippines.  
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succeeded	 in	 negotiating	 with	 the	 authorities	 and	 took	 part	 in	 the	 World	 Bank-
supported	 upgrading	 project	 in	 the	 Tondo	 district	 of	 Manila,	 the	 first	 major	 project	
promoting	self-help	and	community	engagement	in	informal	settlement	upgrading.	The	
outreach	of	these	early	organisational	efforts	was	short-lived;	in	the	early	1980s	CBOs	
and	 NGOs	 started	 falling	 out	 with	 each	 other	 over	 political	 stances	 (Shatkin,	 2002).	
While	decentralisation	reform,	which	continued	beyond	1986,	supported	the	growth	of	
various	 community-based	 organisations,	 it	 also	 resulted	 in	 the	 demobilisation	 of	 the	
urban	poor	movement	(Shatkin,	2002).	During	the	following	decades,	even	the	groups	
who	 were	 most	 successful	 in	 negotiating	 with	 the	 government	 did	 not	 emerge	 as	 a	
wider	movement	advocating	land	reform.	This	consequence	was	linked	to	the	specifics	
of	 the	 governance	 structures,	which	 enabled	 the	 urban	 poor	 to	 bargain	 for	 access	 to	
services	while	 subjecting	 themselves	 to	 the	 patronage	 of	 powerful	 figures	 and	 to	 the	
political	process	(Hutchison,	2007).	One	example	of	 this	 is	 the	arbitrary	 instrument	of	
the	 presidential	 proclamation,	which	 gives	 a	 president	 the	 right	 to	 allocate	 land	 to	 a	
specific	group	by	virtue	of	an	executive	order.	Although	it	supported	the	development	of	
many	 informal	 settlements	 and	 helped	 to	 stop	 forced	 evictions,	 it	 was	 also	 used	 to	
dismantle	a	wider	coalition	focused	on	comprehensive	urban	land	reform.	It	shifted	the	
focus	of	grassroots	organisations	to	the	immediate	needs	of	the	people	in	a	territorially	
circumscribed	manner	(Karaos,	2006).	
Aside	from	these	groupings	that	primarily	centred	on	advocacy,	court	action	or	
community	 work	 in	 a	 specific	 location,	 numerous	 community-based	 organisations	
focused	 on	 co-production	 within	 or	 outside	 of	 the	 official	 governmental	 schemes.	 A	
number	 of	 governmental	 programmes,	 such	 as	 the	 Community	Mortgage	 Program	 or	
the	incremental	modality	of	the	Resettlement	Program,	incentivised	this	approach	and	
mobilised	 a	 large	 number	 of	 communities	 across	 Metro	 Manila	 to	 engage	 in	 co-
production.	 The	 approach	 was	 also	 steered	 outside	 of	 the	 established	 regulatory	
frameworks	of	the	key	shelter	agencies.	On	a	small	scale,	this	engagement	involved,	for	
example,	making	local	plans	and	facilitating	the	incremental	construction	of	housing	by	
people	 with	 materials	 and	 the	 technical	 guidance	 of	 local	 government	 units	 (see	
BASECO	case	where	multiple	organisations	engaged	in	co-productive	schemes	towards	
settlement	 upgrading)	 (Galuszka,	 2014).	 On	 a	 large	 scale,	 federations	 engaged	 in	
independent	 initiatives	 which	 included	 various	 power-building	 activities	 through	 the	
generation	of	their	own	resources,	knowledge	and	planning	routine.	One	example	of	a	
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people’s	organisation	is	the	Homeless	People’s	Federation	Philippines	(HPFPH),	which	
was	formed	in	1998.	In	its	early	phase,	this	federation	developed	savings	schemes	and	
networked	the	urban	poor	in	Metro	Manila	(Yu	&	Karaos,	2004),	and	later	moved	on	to	
mapping	 activities.	 The	 success	 of	 this	 approach	 was	 documented	 in	 2015	 in	
Muntinlupa	City	where	the	informal	settlement	mapping	was	carried	out.	This	case	was	
supported	by	the	authorities	and	became	a	source	of	information	for	the	development	
of	local	upgrading	and	resettlement	strategies.	Simultaneously,	engagement	in	regional	
activities	 through	 large	 international	 networks	 (Karaos	 &	 Porio,	 2015)	 enabled	 the	
group	to	strengthen	its	position	as	a	reliable	partner	of	both	development	aid	agencies	
and	academics	and	therefore	able	to	access	funding	opportunities.		
It	 can	be	argued	 that	 the	combination	of	movements	utilising	different	 strategies	was	
what	provided	the	opportunity	for	a	significant	reordering	of	the	existing	civil	society–
public	sector	relationship.	The	major	stepping	stone	was	the	establishment	 in	2005	of	
the	nationwide	umbrella	organisation	UP-ALL.	Its	launch	brought	together	120	people’s	
organisation	 leaders,	 representing	 about	 600	 organisations	 from	 around	 the	 country	
(Karaos	&	Porio,	2015).	The	UP-ALL	also	 involved	NGO	representatives,	 including	 the	
‘Partnership	 of	 Philippine	 Support	 Service	 Agencies’	 network,	 which	 had	 actively	
supported	 the	 community-based	 organisations	 in	 Metro	 Manila,	 since	 1988.	 Many	 of	
these	 organisations	 specialised	 in	 different	 issues,	 such	 as	 networking	 and	 co-
production,	 and	 some	 included	 in	 their	 portfolio	 protest	 means	 and	 court	 action4.	
Building	 on	 their	 different	 capacities,	 the	 founding	 members	 agreed	 on	 a	 14-point	
agenda	 that	 steered	 the	 advocacy	 efforts	 of	 the	 alliance.	 Overall,	 although	 part	 of	 the	
group	incorporated	activities	rarely	considered	to	be	part	of	a	co-productive	approach,	
such	 as	 court	 action,	 in	 principal	 the	 groups	 agreed	 to	 a	 non-violent	 orientation	 and	
practised	 building	 synergies	 with	 government	 through	 engaging	 in	 co-productive	
solutions	 on	 the	 ground.	 Similarly,	 most	 of	 the	 advocacy	 work,	 or	 court	 action,	 was	
directed	 towards	 the	 increased	 responsibility	 of	 the	 people	 for	 service	 delivery	 and	
programme	design,	thereby	strengthening	their	position	as	co-producers	of	housing.		
As	reported	by	Karaos	and	Porio	(2015),	in	the	years	following	its	establishment,	
the	 UP-ALL	 achieved	 significant	 successes	 mainly	 in	 terms	 of	 reinforcing	 the	 Social	
4	For example, the aforementioned HPFPH follows the logic of the SDI and refrains from engaging in rallies and 
manifestations. Another strong bloc in the UP-ALL, the groups under TRICOR remains active in this field, 
while in parallel it is engaged in various on-the-ground co-productive projects with the public sector.			
14
Finance	 Housing	 Corporation	 (the	 agency	 responsible	 for	 delivering	 the	 Community	
Mortgage	Program)	and	defining	the	rules	and	regulations	surrounding	the	titling	and	
upgrading	of	informal	settlements	on	government-owned	lands.		
However,	the	landmark	opportunity	to	further	the	agenda	of	the	alliance	arrived	
in	the	run-up	to	the	presidential	elections	in	2010,	when	the	civil	society	explored	the	
openness	of	the	candidates	to	their	agenda.	During	this	time,	“the	urban	poor	movement	
made	a	deal	with	then-candidate	Aquino,	so	 the	 liberal	party	(…)	wrote	an	agreement	
with	the	Urban	Poor	Alliance	that	there	shall	be	shift	of	the	strategy	from	off-city	to	in-
city	 relocation”	 (civil	 society,	27.12.2018)5.	The	massive	alliance	could	not	be	 ignored	
by	 the	 politicians	 because	 it	 represented	 a	 significant	 voting	 base,	which	 could	make	
itself	 visible	 through	 rallies	 and	 ‘street-level’	 support	 for	 a	 specific	 candidate.	
Consequently,	 during	 the	 final	 run-up	 to	 the	 elections,	 Aquino	 entered	 into	 an	
agreement	with	the	UP-ALL,	namely	a	10-point	covenant	on	the	demands	of	the	urban	
poor	sector.		
Establishment	of	the	Oplan	LIKAS	
Although	 the	 signing	 of	 the	 10-point	 covenant	was	 the	 essential	 driver	 for	 the	
establishment	of	the	Oplan	LIKAS	programme,	the	urban	poor	were	effectively	able	to	
steer	their	activities	through	several	external	factors.	Most	importantly,	the	engagement	
was	also	motivated	by	a	Supreme	Court	mandamus	from	the	year	2008	that	ordered	the	
clean-up	of	Manila	Bay	and	waterways	 in	urban	areas	within	a	 three-metre	zone.	The	
order	 indicated	 the	 relocation	 of	 a	 large	 number	 of	 informal	 settlers	 living	 along	
waterways.	Around	the	same	time,	in	2009,	the	Philippines	was	struck	by	a	number	of	
devastating	typhoons,	including	Typhoon	Ondoy.	Along	with	the	advocacy	bestowed	by	
the	10-point	covenant,	 the	civil	 society	 “groups	realized	 that	as	a	strategy	we	can	use	
what	 happened	 during	 Ondoy	 to	 better	 convince	 the	 government.	 So	 then	 we	
constructed	 the	 lobbying	 statement:	 government	 you	 spent	 now,	 before	 the	 disaster	
happens”	(civil	society/public	sector,	24-11-2017)	and	“for	government	that	was	logical	
move,	logical	thinking	to	transfer	these	people	away	from	this	waterways”	(civil	society,	
5	The interviewees are referred to based on the sectors they were involved in: ether public sector in general 
(including government or key shelter agency) or civil society (including People’s Organisations) as well as civil 
society/ public sector for those who were engaged in both sectors at various stages of the Oplan LIKAS 
programme.   
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08-12-2017a).	 The	 civil	 society	 effectively	 gained	more	 leverage	 to	 push	 for	 its	 own
approach,	and	 the	mandamus,	which	could	have	posed	a	major	 threat	of	uncontrolled
evictions,	became	an	opportunity	for	better	housing.	Consequently,	at	the	beginning	of
President	 Aquino’s	 term,	 the	 Oplan	 LIKAS	 programme	 began	 to	 be	 formulated.	 The
process	involved	a	series	of	convergence	meetings	and	the	formulation	of	the	Informal
Settler	Families	National	Technical	Working	Group,	which	consisted	of	representatives
of	CSOs,	 local	authorities	and	13	public	sector	agencies	 involved	 in	 the	programme	 in
various	capacities.	The	work	also	benefited	from	the	technical	assistance	of	the	World
Bank.
Although	 the	 realisation	 of	 the	 10-point	 covenant	 was	 difficult	 from	 the	 start	
(Gerald,	2011),	its	process	and	the	resources	devoted	to	the	programme	suggests	that	it	
went	 beyond	 a	 classical	 clientelist	 relationship	 and,	 as	 Hutchison	 (2007)	 puts	 it,	 the	
disallowed	 political	 participation	 of	 the	 urban	 poor.	 Therefore,	 it	 enabled	 true	 co-
production	 of	 policy	 solutions	 and	 access	 to	 governance,	 which	 contrasts	 with	 some	
participatory	 spaces	 established	 by	 power	 holders	 in	Metro	Manila	 only	 to	 reinforce	
their	political	 influence	(Porio,	2012).	Similarly,	 in	contrast	to	the	logic	of	the	populist	
appeal	and	the	performance	of	sincerity	(Garrido,	2017),	the	deal	between	Aquino	and	
the	UP-ALL	created	a	channel	for	the	realisation	of	some	of	the	key	demands	of	the	civil	
society.	 This	 achievement	 can	 be	 captured	within	 the	 three	 dimensions	 of	 the	 Oplan	
LIKAS	programme:	
Financial	Base	
In	 accordance	 with	 points	 4	 (housing	 budget)	 and	 8	 (post-Ondoy	 rehabilitation	
programme)	of	the	covenant,	the	programme	responded	to	the	unrelenting	advocacy	of	
the	 urban	 poor	 for	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 budget	 for	 low-income	 housing.	 In	 November	
2011,	P50	billion	(approximately	US$	1.15	billion)	was	allocated	for	the	period		2011–
2016	to	house	104,000	ISFs	(later	increased	to	around	120,000	families)	(World	Bank,	
2016).	 The	 reserved	 budget	 was	 the	 most	 significant	 financial	 input	 into	 the	 social	
housing	sector	in	the	last	decade	(HUDCC,	2017)	to	be	utilised	by	settlers	living	in	Metro	
Manila	regardless	of	their	affiliation	with	a	specific	political	bloc.		
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Integration	 of	 the	 Urban	 Poor's	 Advocacy	 Points	 into	 the	 Planning	 of	 the	
Programme	(in-city	relocation	and	People’s	Plans)		
From	 the	 start,	 the	 civil	 society	 was	 involved	 in	 the	 formulation	 of	 the	 programme	
through	the	work	of	the	ISF-National	Technical	Working	Group.	The	initial	debates	and	
documents	shaped	by	the	Working	Group	supported	two	key	agenda	points	of	the	civil	
society:	 the	 in-city	 relocation	 and	 the	 adaptation	 of	 the	 People’s	 Plans.	 The	 former	
represented	the	continuous	struggle	of	urban	poor	communities	to	avoid	relocation	to	
distant	off-city	locations,	which	typically	resulted	in	unemployment	and	related	issues.	
The	latter	legitimised	the	co-production	of	multi-storey	housing	between	the	state	and	
the	urban	poor.	Specifically,	 it	assumed	the	alternative	shelter	planning	approach	that	
involves	 ISF	 community	members	 in	 the	 process	 of	 creating,	 drafting	 and	 generating	
their	 plan	 for	 housing	 and	 community	 development.	 From	 forming	 their	 community	
associations,	building	their	capacities,	designing	their	housing	and	community,	as	well	
as	negotiating	with	landowners	and	developers,	to	managing	and	maintaining	their	own	
housing	and	community	(Patiño,	2016,	p.	29).		
Overall	the	approach	was	reflected	in	relevant	documentation	such	as	the	Memorandum	
Circular	resulting	from	the	works	of	ISF	-	National	Technical	Working	Group	as	well	as	
in	 a	 number	 of	 new	programmes	 established	 at	 a	 later	 stage,	 including:	High	Density	
Housing	 of	 the	 SHFC	 and	 the	Micro-Medium-Rise	Building	modality	 of	 the	DILG.	 This	
approach	 is	 directly	 related	 to	 point	 10	 (participation	 and	 stakeholdership)	 and	
indirectly	 to	point	2	 (provide	 support	 for	 area	upgrading	 and	 in-city	 resettlement)	 of	
the	covenant.		
Embedding	the	Civil	Society	into	Key	Shelter	Agencies	
The	 civil	 society	 sector	 influenced	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 staff	 responsible	 for	 the	
implementation	 of	 the	 programme	 and	 its	 institutional	 setup.	 Consequently,	 the	
programme	was	 settled	within	 the	DILG.	As	noted	by	one	of	 the	 civil	 society	 leaders:	
“Most	 of	 our	 networks	 were	 there,	 they	 were	 hired	 because	 we	 really	 pushed”	 and	
“during	that	 time	we	had	a	very	good	Secretary	of	Local	Government,	 Jessie	Robredo”	
(civil	society,	08.12.2017b)	who	previously	served	as	 the	mayor	of	Naga	City	and	was	
known	 for	 applying	participatory	 governance	measures.	 Similarly,	 in	 accordance	with	
the	 preferences	 of	 the	 CSOs,	 the	 programme	 was	 embedded	 in	 the	 Social	 Housing	
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Finance	Corporation,	which	was	chaired	by	the	representative	of	the	non-governmental	
sector,	Ana	Oliveros.	Consequently,	two	out	of	the	three	main	agencies	(Figure	1),	which	
were	 about	 to	 receive	 money	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 programme,	 were	 truly	
influenced	 by	 the	 CSOs.	 Only	 the	 NHA,	 traditionally	 responsible	 for	 the	 resettlement	
programme,	was	beyond	this	influence.	This	indicated	the	partial	delivery	of	point	9	of	
the	covenant	(the	appointments).		
Figure	1.	Simplified	time	frame	of	the	Oplan	LIKAS	programme.	
Governance/Implementation	 Phase:	 Top-Bureaucratic	 and	 Community-Level	
Competition	Over	the	Programme’s	Approach	
With	a	number	of	tangible	and	unprecedented	achievements	at	hand,	Oplan	LIKAS	was	
“a	 golden	opportunity,	was	 supposed	 to	be	 a	 golden	opportunity	 to	push	 for	people’s	
driven	 shelter	 because	 we	 had	 the	 funds”	 (civil	 society/public	 sector,	 01.12.2017).	
However,	 unlike	 in	 the	 empowerment	 phase	 in	 which	 CSOs	 acted	 as	 an	 extraneous	
power,	 the	 programme	 implementation	 period	 posed	 a	 set	 of	 completely	 new	
challenges	 that	 signalled	 the	 volatility	 of	 its	 previous	 achievements.	 Two	 clear	 blocs	
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started	to	emerge	in	the	initial	stage	of	the	programme.	The	first	one,	supportive	of	the	
approaches	of	 the	urban	poor,	 centred	on	 two	main	 implementing	agencies:	 the	DILG	
and	the	SHFC.	The	second	one,	 in	 favour	of	classical	 top-down	housing	measures,	was	
centred	 on	 the	 NHA.	 The	 final	 figures	 of	 the	 programme	 (Table	 1)	 showed	 that	 only	
around	25%	of	 the	 fund	went	 to	 the	progressive	bloc.	Although	 the	 scale	of	 this	 shift	
became	obvious	only	 at	 the	 end	of	 the	programme,	 its	 initial	 years	 already	 suggested	
that	the	civil	society	agenda	was	becoming	undermined,	specifically	when	the	involved	
stakeholders	realised	that	the	first	P10	billion	would	be	allocated	exclusively	to	the	NHA	
because	 “the	 release	of	10	million	 to	NHA	 is	very,	very	 inconsistent	with	 the	spirit	or	
intention	 of	 (…)	 the	 Joint	 Memorandum	 Circular	 because	 the	 NHA	 is	 an	 agency	 that	
builds	relocation	sites	mostly	off-city,	on	distant	relocation	sites”	(civil	society,	27-12-
2017).	This	poses	the	question:	How	was	such	an	obvious	diversion	from	the	essence	of	
the	initial	agreements	possible	so	early	in	the	process?	
Table	1.	Breakdown	of	the	50	billion	fund,	source:	DILG	(2017,	2018)	
AGENCY TARGET UNITS/ 
UTILISATION OF THE 
FUND 
NUMBER OF 
HOUSING UNITS 
DELIVERED   
BREAKDOWN 
OF FUNDING 
(in PhP) 
% 
National 
Housing 
Authority 
Target: 101,210 Completed: 85,053 
Occupied: 63,022 
Off-city: 75,215 
In-city: 9,838 
32,21 billion 64,42% 
Social Housing 
Finance 
Corporation 
Target: 19,6586 Completed: 3729 
Occupied: 730 
Off-city: 6 projects 
Near city:  9 project 
In-city: 12 projects 
9,484 billion 18,97% 
6	The	number	of	target	units	has	changed	during	the	Oplan	LIKAS	process.	The	numbers	indicated	here	
are	based	on	the	data	of	the	DILG	(2017	and	2018).	The	overall	target	of	the	NHA	and	SHFC	is	set	here	at	
120868	units.			
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Department of 
Interior and 
Local 
Government 
-Fund allocation of P1,05 billion
to LGUs for development of
2248 housing units within
People’s Plans driven projects.
Part of the funding to be utilised
by the SHFC for the delivery of
718 housing units.
-Provision of interim shelter
fund P 180,000 for 52734 ISFs.
Target: 2248 
Accomplished units: 434 
Off-city: 1 project 
In-city: 7 projects 
2,489 billion 4,98% 
Department of 
Social Welfare 
and 
Development 
One project: Provision of 
housing to ISFs of Estero de 
San Miguel 
In city: 1 project 531 million 1,06% 
Presidential 
Commission 
for the Urban 
Poor  
Social preparation activities - 40 million 0,08% 
Unallocated - - 5,243 billion 10,49% 
The	first	major	issue	lay	within	the	implementation	and	institutional	logic	of	the	
programme	that	countered	its	progressive	spirit.	On	one	hand,	the	civil	society	agenda,	
including	in-city	resettlement	and	the	People’s	Plans,	was	positioned	as	a	set	of	guiding	
principles	 for	 the	 implementation	of	 the	programme.	On	 the	other	hand,	Oplan	LIKAS	
was	a	resettlement	programme,	and	the	legal	framework,	existing	mandates	of	the	key	
shelter	 agencies	 and	 professional	 routine	 positioned	 the	 NHA	 as	 their	 ‘natural’	
proponent.	The	duality	of	the	approaches	translated	into	an	intense	competition	among	
the	 implementing	 agencies,	 and	 epitomises	 Lefebvre’s	 (1974)	 argument	 that	 space	 is	
the	stake	of	politics.	This	competition	resonated	along	different	levels	of	governance.	At	
the	 level	of	 top	decision	makers,	 it	 involved	formal	and	informal	 lobbying	in	favour	of	
their	 preferred	 approaches	 and,	 unsurprisingly,	 was	 motivated	 by	 political	 and	
economic	 interests.	 The	 issue	was	manifested	 in	 the	works	 of	 the	National	 Technical	
Working	 Group	 on	 the	 ISFs,	 the	 outputs	 of	 which	 were	 contested	 by	 some	 public	
agencies.	 The	 draft	 documentation	 reinforcing	 the	 in-city	 resettlement	 and	 People’s	
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Plans	was	approved	by	the	majority	of	housing	agencies	and	the	civil	society	 in	2013.	
Nevertheless,	 the	 last	 signature	 on	 the	 document	was	 signed	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	
programme.	“The	HUDCC	(Housing	and	Urban	Development	Council)	was	the	last	one	to	
sign	 this	 and	 as	 a	 condition	 to	 sign	 they	 put	 provision	 here	 that	 the	money	 given	 to	
them7	prior	to	signing	of	Circular	will	not	be	covered	by	the	circular”	(government,	19-
02-2018).	That	is,	a	large	portion	of	the	money	used	for	large,	distant,	off-city	relocation
sites	 in	 the	 first	 years	 of	 the	 programme	 by	 the	 NHA	 could	 not	 be	 questioned	 as	 a
misuse	of	the	fund.	One	of	the	motivating	factors	for	the	HUDCC	to	challenge	the	signing
of	 the	programme’s	documentation	was	 the	political	positioning	of	 the	agency.	At	 the
time,	 it	 was	 chaired	 by	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 political	 opposition,	 vice	 president	 Jejomar
Binay,	who	was	the	running	mate	of	an	unsuccessful	candidate	in	the	2010	presidential
elections,	and	one	of	 the	civil	 society	representatives	expressed	 the	 following	view:	 “I
think	that	the	HUDCC	as	chaired	by	Binay,	vice-president	(…)	to	the	National	Technical
Working	Group	 is	 an	 unnecessary	 aberration	 from	 the	 president,	 for	 they	 could	 have
implemented	the	whole	thing	on	their	own”	(civil	society,	27-12-2017).	In	fact,	although
in	2010	vice-president	Binay	publicly	 urged	 for	 a	 change	 to	 the	 existing	 resettlement
modalities,	 saying,	 “There	 have	 been	 numerous	 complaints	 on	 the	 manner	 by	 which
government	 is	 handling	 the	 resettlement	 of	 informal	 settlers.	 It	 has	 proportionately
increased	 the	 concern	 of	 stakeholders	 over	 the	 capacity	 of	 NHA	 and	 other	 housing
agencies	to	effectively	implement	plans	and	programs	of	resettlement”	(HUDCC,	2010),
the	 refusal	 to	 sign	 the	 Joint	 Memorandum	 Circular	 in	 2013	 was	 a	 clear	 statement
against	the	transformation	of	the	resettlement	approach.
The	second	issue	is	that	the	support	given	to	off-city	resettlement	was	related	to	
the	 practical	 need	 of	 the	 NHA	 to	 fulfil	 pre-existing	 contracts	 with	 their	 partner	
developers,	even	though	the	format	and	location	of	the	housing	sharply	contradicted	the	
principles	of	the	in-city	relocation	and	People’s	Plans.	The	financial	mechanism,	which,	
conveniently	 for	 the	 NHA,	 assumed	 the	 disbursement	 of	 money	 in	 yearly	 10	 million	
instalments,	 further	 supported	 the	 agency	 in	 promoting	 its	 solutions.	 Predicting	 how	
challenging	 cooperation	 with	 the	 NHA	 would	 be,	 the	 CSOs	 were	 already	 pushing	 to	
embed	 the	 programme	 into	 the	 DILG	 prior	 to	 2011.	 However,	 this	 move	 was	
insufficient,	 and	 the	 resistance	 of	 the	 NHA	 and	 the	 HUDCC	 counterbalanced	 the	
7	National	Housing	Authority	
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influence	of	CSOs	on	the	other	implementing	agencies.	This	suggests	that	direct	access	
to	governance	space,	in	which	civil	society	could,	formally	or	informally,	try	to	affect	the	
planning	process,	did	not	automatically	mean	that	the	civil	society	had	the	capacity	to	
navigate	 the	 new	 bureaucratic	 struggles	 (Galuszka,	 2019)	 guided	 by	 a	 completely	
different	set	of	developmental	logic	(Watson,	2003).	
Simultaneously,	 the	competition	between	 the	progressive	and	 the	conventional	
approaches	trickled	down	to	ground	level,	where	local	groups	began	to	be	approached	
by	external	mobilizers	who	tried	to	obtain	their	support	for	one	of	the	modalities	of	the	
programme.	Knowing	that	a	majority	of	the	funding	would	be	initially	consumed	by	the	
NHA,	some	urban	poor	groups	tried	to	approach	the	agency	and	negotiate	for	an	in-city	
option,	an	effort	that	turned	out	to	be	unsuccessful	at	that	stage.	Consequently,	the	civil	
society	continued	its	advocacy	to	position	the	SHFC	as	the	recipient	of	a	portion	of	the	
P50	billion	fund.	This	goal	was	achieved	only	 in	2013	when	the	High	Density	Housing	
programme	 was	 established	 (Figure	 1).	 This	 experience	 revealed	 a	 broad	 trend	 of	
communities	 being	 dragged	 between	 People’s	 Plans	 and	 off-city	 relocations.	 The	 civil	
society	attributed	the	large	number	of	communities	convinced	to	move	to	off-city	sites	
as	an	effect	of	the	conscious	campaigning	of	the	NHA	and	some	of	the	local	governments	
against	 the	 People’s	 Plans.	 These	 plans	 were	 presented	 as	 being	 long	 and	 uncertain,	
which	narrowed	down	to	a	message	that	“if	you	don’t	take	NHA	housing	now	you	will	be	
demolished	 and	 evicted	 anyway	 and	 you	might	 find	 yourself	 without	 a	 housing	 unit	
assigned	 to	 yourself”	 (civil	 society,	 27-12-2017).	 Ironically,	 in	 the	 public	 domain,	 the	
rushed	 relocation	 to	 off-city	 sites	 was	 also	 backed	 up	 by	 the	 disaster	 risk	 reduction	
logic,	which	made	 local	 governments	 liable	 for	 cleaning	 a	 three-metre	 area	 along	 the	
waterways.	 Thus,	 the	 local	 authorities	 mobilised	 to	 remove	 the	 settlers	 as	 fast	 as	
possible,	 and	 the	 NHA	 provided	 this	 opportunity.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 original	 lobbying	
statements	 of	 the	 civil	 society,	 which	 helped	 it	 to	 secure	 the	 P50	 billion	 fund,	 were	
positioned	against	the	People’s	Plans	approach.		
Admittedly,	 these	 plans	 were	 not	 present	 and	 the	 model	 of	 development	 was	
uncertain	in	the	early	stage	of	the	programme,	since:	“there	is	a	lot	of	money,	you	have	
DILG,	NHA,	 SHFC	 so	 you	do	not	 know	who	 really	 is	 the	main	 agency	who	 coordinate	
who	 assist,	 who	 evaluates,	 how	 this	 fund	 was	 being	 used	 and	 utilised”	 (People’s	
Organisation,	 07-12-2017).	 Most	 of	 the	 informal	 communities	 lacked	 strong	
organisation	and	agency	 to	engage	with	 it,	which	meant	 “they	are	 left	at	 the	mercy	of	
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default	option,	which	 is	off-city	 resettlement”	 (public	 sector/civil	 society	02.03.2018).	
Consequently,	 there	were	 reports	of	 communities	mobilised	 to	engage	 in	 the	People’s	
Planning	process	 shifting	position	 and	opting	 for	 the	 cheaper	 and	more	 rapid	 off-city	
solution	proposed	by	the	NHA.	However,	although	the	approach	had	the	true	advantage	
of	 being	 fast	 and	 inexpensive	 for	 the	 beneficiaries,	 the	 aforementioned	 socio-political	
factors	 can	be	 considered	 as	 equal,	 if	 not	more	 important,	 to	 the	way	 the	P50	billion	
fund	was	utilised.	These	 factors	emerge	as	 central	points	of	debate	when	 considering	
the	quality	of	the	delivered	sites	and	the	socio-economic	effects	of	off-city	resettlement	
(as	illustrated	by	an	evaluation	of	the	long-term	benefits	of	in-city	relocation	compared	
to	the	off-city	standardised	approach)	(Ballesteros	and	Egana,	2012).	As	expected,	 the	
off-city	resettlement	sites	built	within	Oplan	LIKAS	experienced	the	same	issues	as	the	
resettlements	 constructed	 in	 previous	 decades.	 Some	 of	 the	 relocation	 sites	 lacked	
adequate	water	and	electricity	services,	and	the	livelihood	restoration	support	in	these	
sites	was	limited	(World	Bank,	2017).	Owing	to	these	issues,	the	government	committed	
to	 providing	 additional	 investment	 and	 upgrading	 interventions.	 In	 2017,	 about	 P1.8	
billion,	 taken	 from	 the	 newly	 reserved	 P5.5	 billion,	 was	 released	 for	 improvements	
works	in	these	neighbourhoods	(Bonaqua,	2017).		
Control	Over	Resources	and	Development,	Institutionalisation	and	the	Land	
Access	Issue	
Having	established	the	socio-political	context	of	off-city	relocation,	I	discuss	here	
the	resistance	of	the	political	and	bureaucratic	machinery	within	the	conservative	strain	
of	 the	key	shelter	agencies	as	the	opposition	to	two	key	objectives	of	 the	civil	society:	
gaining	wider	access	to	resources	and	greater	control	over	the	development	process,	as	
laid	out	in	section	3	of	this	article.		
The	difficulty	of	attaining	a	balanced	influence	on	governance	is	clearly	exhibited	
in	 the	 land	 access	 issue.	This	 central	 determinant	 for	 the	 success	 of	 any	 resettlement	
programme	was	problematic	in	the	Metro	Manila	context	during	the	decades	preceding	
the	 programme.	 In	 the	 early	 post-colonial	 period,	 private	 sector	 actors	 belonging	 to	
several	 powerful	 families,	 such	 as	 the	 Ayalas,	 Aranetas,	 Ortigases	 and	 Tuazons,	
dominated	 the	 local	 real	 estate	market	 (Garrido,	 2013).	 In	 the	 following	 decades,	 the	
urban	enclaves,	ranging	from	gated	communities	to	condominium	districts,	which	were	
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developed	by	financially	capable	private	investors,	occupied	more	and	more	land	with	
exclusive	 designation	 for	 local	 elites,	 expats	 and	 overseas	 Filipino	workers	 (Kleibert,	
2018).	This	stark	competition	for	land	positioned	informal	settlers	as	the	key,	yet	easily	
removable,	 ‘obstacle’	 for	 the	 reinvention	 of	 commercially	 valuable	 areas	 in	 Metro	
Manila	 (Choi,	 2016).	 According	 to	 the	 law,	 the	 local	 government	 units	 (LGUs)	 are	
mandated	 to	delimit	 land	 for	 social	housing	within	 their	boundaries.	However,	by	 the	
end	of	the	Oplan	LIKAS	process,	only	5	out	of	the	16	cites	and	one	municipality	in	Metro	
Manila	updated	the	Comprehensive	Land	Use	Plans	in	place	(World	Bank,	2017),	which	
meant	 insufficient	 or	 no	 land	 reserved	 for	 social	 housing.	 The	 situation	 was	 not	
challenged	 even	 with	 the	 support	 of	 international	 agencies	 such	 as	 the	 Asian	
Development	Bank,	which	unsuccessfully	promoted	land	sharing	and	subsidiary	models	
for	 in-city	 social	 housing	 in	 the	 years	 preceding	 the	 Oplan	 LIKAS	 (Hutchison,	 Hout,	
Hughes	&	Robison	2014).	These	issues,	including	“problems	on	determining	vacant	land	
for	 in-city	 relocation”	 (key	 shelter	 agency,	 01.02.2018)	 provided	 the	 NHA	 with	 a	
justification	 for	 their	 focus	 on	 off-city	 relocation	 when	 faced	 with	 the	 lack	 of	 lands	
reserved	for	social	housing	by	the	LGUs.		
However,	the	civil	society	designed	a	mechanism	to	address	the	problem.	Facing	
difficulties	 in	 obtaining	 land,	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	main	 urban	 poor	 groups	 agreed	 on	 a	
multi-storey	 housing	 approach	 (World	 Bank,	 2016),	 which	 in	 previous	 decades	 had	
been	 contested	 in	 the	 low-income	 communities	 (Karaos,	 2006).	 The	 principles	 of	 the	
People’s	 Plans	were	 embedded	 in	 the	 High	 Density	 Housing	 programme	 of	 the	 SHFC	
(Figure	1).	The	communities	were	entitled	to	find	their	own	land,	select	developers	for	
the	 construction,	 manage	 the	 process	 and	 establish	 facility	 management	 structures.	
Thus,	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 the	 land	 research	 component	 was	 supposed	 to	
counterbalance	 the	 inability	 (or	unwillingness)	of	 the	 local	governments	 to	 fulfil	 their	
statutory	function	and	to	support	 in-city	relocation.	As	such,	 the	communities	were	to	
retain	greater	control	over	 the	development	process	 through	 land	 identification	while	
being	 entitled	 to	 source	 resources	 from	 the	 P50	 billion	 fund	 to	 develop	 their	 multi-
storey	housing.	This	type	of	compromise	had	mixed	results.	Given	the	small	number	of	
projects	 completed	with	 the	People’s	Plans	 (Table	1)	by	 the	end	of	2017,	 the	process	
turned	out	to	be	vulnerable	to	various	challenges.	In	addition	to	the	issue	of	community	
mobilisation,	the	land	access	issue	was	again	what	the	civil	society	leaders	identified	as	
critical.	As	noted	by	one	of	the	civil	society	leaders:	“It	should	have	been	in-city	because	
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we	don’t	believe	 in	off-site	so	 they	allocated	50	billion	but	 this	 is	not	enough	because	
money	alone	(…)	and	People’s	Plans	will	be	not	a	guarantee	if	you	have	no	land”	(civil	
society,	 08-12-2017b).	 For	 instance,	 the	 CSO	 representatives	 reported	 that	 the	 land	
identified	by	 the	communities,	after	a	 tedious	and	 lengthy	process,	was	 in	some	cases	
immediately	purchased	by	a	LGU	once	the	community	‘revealed’	its	information.	Similar	
difficulties	were	reported	in	the	search	for	public	land	by	some	communities,	with	the	
public	sector	characterised	by	a	tendency	to	resist	or	delay	the	process,	while	“there	is	
too	much	 trouble	 we	 encounter	 in	 raising	 the	 fund,	 explaining	 the	 technicalities	 and	
about	the	conflict	of	legalities,	conflict	of	mandate”	(People’s	Organisation,	10-03-2018).	
In	 effect,	 these	 challenges	 relate	 to	 the	 question	 of	whether	 the	 co-productive	
engagement	of	 the	civil	society	can	 indeed	ensure	a	 tighter	degree	of	control	over	 the	
development	process	while	simultaneously	helping	the	process	of	the	redistribution	of	
resources..	The	main	stumbling	block	 for	using	 the	 fund	 for	 in-city	 relocation	was	 the	
lack	 of	 land	 access.	 Civil	 society	 operations	 did	 unblock	 some	of	 the	 idle	 lands	 in	 the	
metropolis	for	mid-rise	buildings.	However,	these	small	successes	did	not	translate	into	
a	general	shift	towards	land	accessibility.	Thus,	the	institutionalisation	of	land	research	
by	 communities	 could	be	positioned	as	 an	ersatz	 solution	 to	 a	bigger	problem,	which	
lies	in	the	blockage	of	public	and	private	land	for	different	priorities.	This	issue	may	be	
linked	 to	 simple	 economic	 gain	 or	 the	 aforementioned	orientation	 of	 formal	 planning	
towards	 the	 needs	 of	 elite	 consumers	 (Garrido,	 2013).	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 fixed	 legal	
basis	 on	 a	 countrywide	 scale	 making	 in-city	 relocation	 (or	 the	 near-city	 option)	
mandatory	 and	 requiring	 that	 resettlement	 be	 generally	 driven	 by	 People’s	 Plans,	
programme-level	institutionalisation	was	easily	condemned	by	its	critics	as	a	slow	and	
expensive	 solution.	 This	 response	 questions	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 institutionalised	 co-
production	 (Joshie	 &	 Moore,	 2004)	 can	 affect	 broader	 governance	 trends.	 The	 case	
study	suggests	that	in	an	exclusionary	governance	setting,	two	out	of	the	three	levels	of	
institutionalisation	 discussed	 by	 Ackerman	 (2004),	 namely,	 inscribing	 a	 participatory	
mechanism	 into	 the	 strategic	 plans	 of	 the	 government	 and	 setting	 up	 new	 agencies	
ensuring	 participation,	 may	 be	 easily	 contested.	 The	 third	 level,	 inscribing	 the	
participatory	solution	into	law,	was	acknowledged	by	some	of	the	civil	society	groups	as	
a	missing	element	 in	the	Oplan	LIKAS	process.	Currently,	based	on	the	efforts	of	CSOs	
and	urban	poor	groups,	the	bill	on	“on-site,	in-city	or	near-city”	resettlement	in	support	
of	 People’s	 Plans	 is	 pending	 in	 the	 Philippine	 Senate.	 However,	 when	 tracing	 the	
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implementation	 of	 UDHA	 legislation	 from	 1992,	 including	 the	 previously	 discussed	
failure	to	 identify	 the	 land	for	social	housing	purposes,	 the	effects	of	 the	third	 level	of	
institutionalisation	remain	unknown.		
Co-production	in	Perspective	
The	 process	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 UP-ALL,	 the	 10-point	 covenant	 and	 the	
establishment	of	the	P50	billion	fund	for	the	ISFs	is	an	example	of	the	civil	society	and	
urban	 poor	 sector	 achieving	 movement	 from	 small	 and	 mezzo-scale	 co-productive	
projects	 to	 the	 metro-scale	 engagement	 of	 co-production	 of	 urban	 space	 and	
governance	 in	 Metro	 Manila.	 However,	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 programme	 also	
illustrates	how	volatile	this	achievement	was.	The	analysis	suggests	that	the	strategies	
leading	 to	 the	 success	 of	 CSOs	 in	 the	 scaling-up	 phase	 were	 less	 successful	 in	 the	
governance/implementation	phase.	
The	success	achieved	in	the	first	phase	lies	in	three	key	points.	Firstly,	the	initial	
phase	 included	 the	 internal	 ability	 to	 build	 up	 a	 network	 large	 enough	 to	 engage	 in	
collective	action.	Secondly,	it	involved	external	boosting	of	the	credibility	of	the	alliance	
through	multiple	engagements	at	different	levels	of	governance,	starting	at	community	
level	and	ending	in	cooperation	with	international	agencies	(Herrle	et	al.,	2015).	Social-
movement	 initiated	 co-production,	 understood	 as	 a	 deliberate	 mobilisation	 and	
engagement	 in	 the	 service	 delivery	 process,	 was	 instrumental	 in	 these	 two	 points.	
However,	 the	 third	 crucial	 point,	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 contestation	 and	 advocacy	
strategies	utilised	by	a	part	of	the	UP-ALL	network,	questions	the	understanding	of	co-
production	 as	 a	 consensual	 engagement	 and	 points	 out	 how	 it	 differs	 from	 the	
collaborative	 planning	 process	 (Watson,	 2014).	 In	 fact,	 collaboration,	 contention	 and	
subversion	are	identified	as	complementary	strategies	of	the	grassroots	(Mitlin,	2018).	
The	 research	 supports	 the	view	 that	 the	 interaction	of	 co-production	and	non-violent	
protest	 activities,	 including	 court	 action,	 are	 so	 strongly	 intertwined	 and	 built	 upon	
each	other	that	they	form	a	part	of	one	approach.	The	network	did,	in	principle,	aim	at	
non-violent	forms	of	contention	whenever	the	power	‘generated,’	though	co-productive	
engagements	did	not	enable	them	to	secure	their	interests.	For	instance,	in	the	context	
of	 Montinlupa	 City,	 where	 competition	 for	 land	 was	 relatively	 limited	 and	 the	 local	
government	was	open	 to	cooperation	with	communities,	 the	mapping	activities	of	 the	
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HPFPH	could	be	scaled	up	without	the	need	to	resort	to	more	confrontational	measures.	
In	 Manila,	 where	 local	 government	 is	 much	 less	 open	 to	 cooperation	 and	 where	
competition	 for	 land	 is	 extreme,	 rallies	 in	 support	 of	 co-production	 and	 against	
relocation	 emerge	 as	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 the	 strategy.	 Similarly,	 at	 project	 level,	
resisting	 relocation	 was	 in	 some	 cases	 a	 starting	 point	 for	 utilising	 elements	 of	 co-
production	and	the	People’s	Plans.		
This	approach	may	resonate	also	in	the	activities	of	the	international	networks,	
commonly	 labelled	 as	 utilising	 co-production,	 including	 the	 SDI,	which,	 in	 spite	 of	 its	
declared	separation	 from	contention	strategies,	has	regional	affiliates	who	 integrate	 it	
into	their	actions	(Huchzermayer,	in	press).	In	other	words,	the	research	confirms	that	
the	 ideal	 model	 of	 conflict-free	 co-production,	 either	 at	 community	 level	 or	 on	 the	
community–politics	 interface,	 is	 highly	 unlikely,	 particularly	 when	 we	 talk	 about	 co-
production	of	governance.	Finally,	even	if	these	activities	of	the	co-production-oriented	
urban	poor	bloc	were	not	characterised	by	clearly	confrontational	dynamics	typical	of	
political	movements	aiming	at	universal	transformation	(Dikeç	&	Swyngedouw,	2017),	
the	pre-electoral	street-level	activities	of	the	UP-ALL	were	a	form	of	political	act.	In	fact,	
simply	building	up	 a	network	 through	 the	 co-productive	process	 is,	 in	 itself,	 political.	
Forming	a	massive	grouping	capable	of	affecting	political	processes	makes	these	groups	
and	their	leaders	a	relevant	force	in	election-based	systems.	As	such,	the	ability	to	form	
ad	hoc	alliances	 (starting	 from	 the	bottom-up	 level	within	small	 administrative	units)	
should	be	brought	 into	the	debate	as	an	 important	element	 framing	the	co-productive	
arrangements.		
Using	these	three	key	approaches,	the	civil	society	achieved	the	following	in	the	
first	phase:	
- secured	a	redistribution	of	resources	for	social	housing,
- positioned	its	main	agenda	points	at	the	centre	of	planning	discussions	and
- had	their	representatives	taken	on	by	some	of	the	most	important	shelter	agencies	in
Metro	Manila.
These	 achievements	 left	 several	 tangible	 legacies,	 such	 as	 proving	 that	 in-city	
resettlement	and	multi-storey	social	housing	is	an	option,	building	a	direct	engagement	
between	urban	poor	groups	and	the	private	sector	and	designating	the	People’s	Plans	as	
an	 approach	 for	 planned	 resettlement	 projects	 in	 the	 country	 (mentioned	 in	 the	
documentation	concerning	the	North-South	Rail	project).	However,	the	implementation	
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of	 the	programme	remains	 in	sharp	contrast	 to	 the	hopes	 that	were	awakened	by	 the	
P50	 billion	 fund.	 It	 was	 already	 clear	 during	 the	 implementation	 phase	 of	 the	 Oplan	
LIKAS	that	the	three	aforementioned	achievements	were	being	challenged.	The	reasons	
for	 this	 contestation	 lay	 beyond	 the	 practicalities	 of	 the	 approach,	 such	 as	 cost	 of	 an	
intervention	or	its	applicability	to	the	needs	of	the	concerned	communities.		
The	 bureaucratic	 and	 political	 machinery	 severely	 contested	 the	 civil	 society	
approaches,	and	was	effective	in	doing	so	because	of	off-stage	lobbying	and	the	shaping	
of	 the	 programme	 in	 accordance	 with	 conventional	 budgetary	 and	 implementation	
measures.	On	the	one	hand,	the	urban	poor	groups,	which	were	effective	in	navigating	
informality	 in	 their	 own	 context,	 had	 fewer	 tools	 to	 engage	 with	 the	 informality	
unfolding	 in	 the	 bureaucratic	 environment	 of	 the	 key	 shelter	 agencies.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	attempts	 to	 integrate	 the	approaches	of	 the	civil	 society	were	also	contested	by	
the	 ‘formal’	and	operational	 logic	of	bureaucracy	in	Metro	Manila	and	the	institutional	
setup	 it	 promoted.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	 NHA	 planning	 routine	 was	 put	 forward	 as	 a	
justification	 for	 continuing	 to	deliver	 services	 in	 the	 same	way	as	 it	had	always	done,	
failing	 to	 recognise	 that	 off-city	 resettlement	 planning,	 with	 its	 territorial	 and	
procedural	 dimensions,	 was	 a	 form	 of	 control	 and	 oppression	 (Yiftachel,	 1998).	
Similarly,	as	in	the	international	context,	this	happened	despite	the	supposed	openness	
of	 the	 power	 holders	 and	 policy	 logic,	 which	 operated	 with	 the	 language	 of	
inclusiveness	(Appadurai,	2001;	Watson,	2011)	but	pushed	for	the	P50	billion	fund	to	
be	allocated	to	conventional	housing	modality.	While	the	People’s	Plans	were	supposed	
to	be	guaranteed	through	a	set	of	important	documents,	such	as	the	Joint	Memorandum	
Circular,	 the	 flexibility	 of	 the	 approach	 contradicted	 the	 rigid	 process	 of	 the	 yearly	
disbursement	of	money	and	the	legal	mandate	of	the	LGUs	to	vacate	in	a	timely	manner,	
the	risk-prone	areas	around	waterways.	Thus,	the	involvement	of	civil	society	actors	in	
the	 process	 exposed	 them	 to	 the	 political	 and	 intra-bureaucratic	 dynamics	 they	
encountered	on	a	smaller	scale	when	acting	as	an	extraneous	power	attempting	 to	be	
involved	 in	 governance.	 The	 contestation	 strategies,	 which	 were	 relevant	 during	 the	
scaling	up	phase,	were	arguably	less	effective	because	the	civil	society	representatives	
managed	 the	 implementation	 process	 and	 were	 somehow	 subjected	 to	 the	 logic	 of	
‘accomplishing	 the	 project’.	 Additionally,	 the	 programme	 was	 hampered	 by	 the	 land	
access	 issue.	The	 institutionalisation	of	 the	People’s	Plans	 revealed	 itself	 as	 a	double-
edged	 sword:	 the	 discourse	 on	 the	 speed	 of	 the	 classical	 off-city	 resettlement	 was	
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positioned	against	the	‘slowness’	of	the	people’s	solutions.	When	local	governments	and	
governmental	 agencies	 compete	 for	 the	 same	 resource	 as	 the	 civil	 society,	 co-
production	is	at	risk	of	being	contested.	In	this	context,	the	institutionalisation	of	 land	
research	by	the	communities,	within	the	High	Density	Housing	programme,	may	not	be	
enough	 to	overcome	 the	passivity	of	 the	LGUs	 in	 the	execution	of	 their	 legal	 function,	
namely	 securing	 in-city	 land	 for	 social	 housing.	 This	 point	 confirms	 that	 the	
institutionalisation	 of	 co-production	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 South	 is	 not	 uniformly	 a	
guarantee	 that	 the	 urban	 poor	 will	 succeed	 in	 mainstreaming	 their	 approaches,	
particularly	when	the	implementation	logic	of	a	programme	counters	the	spirit	of	those	
approaches,	or	when	 it	 is	used	as	an	ersatz	 justification	 for	 the	negligent	execution	of	
pro-poor	law.		
What	 the	 above-mentioned	 experiences	mean	 for	 the	understanding	 of	 the	 co-
production	 governance	 change	 process,	 is	 that	 innovations	 achieved	 at	 project-	 or	
mezzo-level	 will	 typically	 be	 challenged	 when	 scaling	 up.	 The	 main	 challenges	 are	
linked	to	 the	aspiration	of	mirroring	own	protocols	and	ensuring	 flexibility	within	co-
produced	governance	when	organisations	have	to	operate	within	existing	legal	systems	
which	run	counter	to	those	principles.	While	co-production	 is	conventionally	a	way	of	
overcoming	the	shortcomings	of	official	regulations	(Watson,	2014)	and	tends	to	work	
when	there	is	a	strong	relationship	between	the	local	authorities	and	the	communities,	
the	 aspiration	 to	 scale	 up	 exposes	 these	 innovations	 to	 a	 conventional	 bureaucratic	
machinery	 typically	 more	 interested	 in	 quantitative	 success	 than	 qualitative	
improvements	 (Galuszka,	 2017).	 In	 such	 cases,	 the	 conventional	 wisdom	 that	 co-
management	 and	 co-governance	 are	 enabled	 by	 institutionalisation	 and	 the	 public	
sector	 should	 be	 questioned	 in	 the	 context	 of	 exclusionary	 governance	 settings.	 The	
failure	 of	 civil	 society	 to	 fully	 benefit	 from	 the	 context	 created	 by	 the	 Oplan	 LIKAS	
suggests	 that	 co-production	 of	 governance	 is	 an	 open-ended	 process	 which	 will	
experience	 highs	 and	 lows	 while	 interacting	 with	 the	 bureaucratic	 machinery	 of	 the	
state.	Maintaining	a	mobilised	network	of	people	engaged	in	collective	action	and,	even	
unintentionally,	representing	some	sort	of	unaffiliated	political	power	able	to	negotiate	
ad	hoc	coalitions,	might	be	a	stronger	guarantee	of	sustainability	of	People’s	approaches	
than	 the	 creation	 of	 programme-level	 frameworks	 (which	may	 or	may	not	 be	 helpful	
depending	 on	 the	 wider	 governance	 context).	 This	 points	 to	 the	 centrality	 of	 the	
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internal	 function	 of	 co-production,	 namely	 its	 role	 in	 creating	 large	 networks	 linked	
through	collective	action.	
However	 this	 ‘security	 buffer’	 for	 co-production	 of	 governance	 –	 the	 active,	
interlinked	and	numerous	community-organisations	-	may	paradoxically	be	threatened	
when	 the	 changes	 instigated	 by	 social	 movements	 take	 the	 form	 of	 resources.	 The	
mobilisation	 of	 the	 communities	 on	 the	 ground	 within	 the	 Oplan	 LIKAS	 was	 not	 as	
smooth	 as	 expected,	 and	 this	 resulted	 in	 a	 large	 number	 of	 people	 opting	 for	
resettlement	in	off-city	neighbourhoods.	As	much	as	this	can	be	attributed	to	the	active	
lobbying	 of	 conservative	 actors,	 it	 also	 suggests	 that	 co-productive	modality,	 such	 as	
High	Density	Housing,	may	 not	 be	 uniformly	 attractive	 to	 informal	 dwellers	when	 its	
initial	 costs	 outweigh	 long-term	benefits	 (Ballesteros,	Ramos	&	Magtibay,	 2017).	This	
points	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 representation	within	 the	 co-productive	 process	 and	 poses	 the	
following	 question:	 Are	 people	 willing	 to	 engage	 in	 co-production	 when	 given	 direct	
access	 to	resources,	even	 if	 these	resources	are	 in	 faraway	relocation	sites?	Similar	 to	
the	 experiences	 of	 the	 Capital	 Subsidy	 Scheme	 in	 South	 Africa,	 the	 ease	 of	 pushing	
people	to	these	off-city	sites	without	serious	contestation	(World	Bank,	2017)	suggests	
that	 the	resources	may	 function	as	an	 instrument	of	 socio-economic	control,	 in	which	
“popular	 awareness	 of	 this	 individual	 entitlement	 leads	 directly	 to	 a	 demand	 for	
standardized	delivery,	leaving	no	space	for	collective	reflection	on	the	appropriateness	
of	the	individualized	product”	(Huchzermeyer,	2003,	p.	600).	Although	in	the	Philippine	
context	‘entitlement’	is	only	partial	since	the	housing	must	be	paid	for,	a	similar	role	is	
likely	 played	 by	 the	 lower	 cost	 of	 an	 off-city	 location	 which	 comes	 with	 a	 clear	
ownership	 title,	 compared	 to	 the	 usufruct	 agreement	 that	 applies	 in	 most	 in-city	
locations.	Consequently,	the	sustainability	of	the	P50	billion	fund	was	hampered	by	the	
civil	society's	lack	of	control	over	the	distribution	of	the	money,	suggesting	that	neither	
of	 their	goals	–	 redistribution	of	 resources	and	control	over	 the	process	–	was	 totally	
achieved.		
Conclusions	
This	article	documents	the	engagement	of	the	civil	society	in	urban	governance	in	Metro	
Manila	 beyond	 the	 process	 of	 small	 and	 mezzo-scale	 cooperation	 projects	 with	 the	
public	 sector.	The	 scaling	up	phase	was	 linked	 to	 the	 considerable	 success	of	 the	UP-
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ALL,	 manifested	 by	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 P50	 billion	 fund,	 the	 orientating	 policy	
discussion	 on	 the	 issues	 of	 co-productive	 modality	 of	 People’s	 Plans	 and	 in-city	
resettlement,	 and	 the	 employment	 of	 civil	 society	 actors	 in	 the	 main	 implementing	
agencies	of	the	Oplan	LIKAS	programme.	As	such,	the	engagement	achieved	much	more	
than	past	participatory	approaches,	which	provided	some	new	communication	channels	
between	the	society	and	the	state	but	failed	to	impact	directly	on	policy	making	(Karaos,	
2006)	 or	 help	 to	 disentangle	 communities	 from	 the	 patronage	 of	 powerful	 figures	
(Hutchison,	 2007;	 Porio,	 2012).	 However,	 the	 governance/implementation	 phase	
revealed	that	these	achievements	left	a	few	tangible	legacies,	among	them	proof	that	a	
people-driven	development	of	in-city,	mid-rise	social	housing	is	possible.	The	fund	was	
mainly	 utilised	 for	 conventional	 off-city	 resettlement,	 People’s	 Plans	 were	 rarely	
developed,	and	a	majority	of	the	civil	society	activists	lost	their	jobs	in	the	key	shelter	
agencies	after	the	change	of	political	leadership	in	the	country.		
An	analysis	of	the	process	offers	several	valuable	lessons	for	understanding	and	
advancing	a	governance-oriented	co-productive	process	in	an	exclusionary	governance	
setting.	
									Firstly,	 the	 centrality	 of	 conflict	 in	 the	 process	 remains	 crucial.	 The	 cooperative	
dimensions	of	 co-production	are	essential	 in	 the	scaling	up	phase	–	and	have	both	an	
internal	 function	 (to	 build	 up	 a	 network)	 and	 an	 external	 function	 (to	 build	
relationships	with	 government).	 As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 two	 functions	 the	 co-production	
movement	reaches	further	than	participatory	schemes,	which	may	dismantle	collective	
agenda-building	 and	 promote	 existing	 solutions	 rather	 than	 devising	 new	 ones.	
However,	 moving	 into	 co-production	 of	 governance	 is	 unlikely	 to	 happen	 unless	 the	
movement,	or	a	part	of	 it,	 is	able	 to	engage	 in	protests,	manifest	dissatisfaction,	resist	
relocation,	 establish	 interactions	 with	 high-level	 politicians	 and,	 in	 so	 doing,	 be	
perceived	as	possessing	political	power.	Therefore,	 the	conventional	understanding	of	
entirely	 non-political,	 consensual	 movements	 focusing	 on	 co-production	 is	 put	 into	
question	when	groups	try	to	scale	up	and	genuinely	affect	urban	governance,	especially	
in	an	exclusionary	setting.	 I	argue	here	 that	at	 this	stage	co-production	of	governance	
requires	 the	 integration	 of	 protest-based	 strategies,	 and	 that	 consensus-	 and	
contention-based	 approaches	 are	 barely	 separable.	 Purely	 consensual	 co-production	
that	 mainly	 employs	 a	 showing-by-doing	 approach	 may	 be	 effective	 in	 an	 inclusive	
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setting,	 but	 this	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 the	 case	 in	 contexts	 where	 land	 prices	 are	 sky-
rocketing.		
Secondly,	 the	 research	 questions	 the	 assumption	 that	 institutionalised	 co-
production	(Joshi	and	Moore,	2004)	is	a	guarantee	of	the	sustainability	of	the	approach.	
If	 the	 co-productive	 approach	 is	 institutionalised	 at	 project	 and	 programme	 level	
without	broader	support	at	governance	level,	then	the	process	itself	may	limit	the	reach	
of	the	approach	and	exhibit	the	same	vulnerabilities	as	participatory	planning	schemes.	
Such	a	mechanism	may	actually	result	 in	 the	positioning	of	co-productive	solutions	as	
‘innovations’	or	as	‘alternative’	service	delivery	mechanisms,	with	the	majority	of	public	
contracts	 being	 consumed	 by	 big	 developers	 offering	 standardised	 mass	 housing	 in	
peripheral	 locations	 of	 cities.	 This	 relates	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 conflicting	 rationalities	
(Watson,	2003)	and	powerful	imaginaries	of	a	dichotomy	between	formal	and	informal	
sectors	 (McFarlane,	 2012b)	 as	 strong	 drivers	motivating	 replication	 of	 ‘formal’	 urban	
practice.		
Thirdly,	even	if	communities	engage	in	collective	action	and	are	the	proponents	
of	 governance	 change,	 their	 outputs,	 such	 as	 redistribution	 of	 resources,	may,	 in	 fact,	
hamper	 mainstreaming	 of	 co-production.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 assumption	 that	
communities	will	always	be	eager	to	lead	the	process	of	change	may	be	valid	when	they	
do	 not	 have	 any	 other	 solutions	 to	 hand.	 Yet,	 when	 offered	 faster,	 ready-made	
alternatives	while	 being	 pressured	 to	 relocate,	many	 people	will	 choose	 these	 over	 a	
complex	 co-productive	 process,	 especially	 when	 community	 leadership	 is	 weak	 or	
fragmented.	 This	 also	 means	 that	 reflection	 on	 intra-community	 relations	 as	 a	
precondition	for	the	leveraging	of	co-production	should	be	repositioned	at	the	centre	of	
the	academic	inquiry.		
Overall,	 co-production	 remains	 a	 highly	 paradoxical	 process.	 It	 does	 instigate	
change	 of	 governance	but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 its	 intrinsic	 vulnerabilities	may	 affect	 the	
sustainability	of	the	change.	Addressing	this	paradox	is	central	for	academicians	and	for	
the	civil	society	actors	themselves	in	order	to	make	progress	in	scaling	up	the	approach	
and	developing	more	equitable	urban	 settlements	 and	governance	 systems.	While	 co-
production	may	be	one	of	 the	most	powerful	mechanisms	 for	citizens	 to	meaningfully	
engage	 with	 the	 public	 sector,	 when	 the	 engagement	 reaches	 the	 highest	 level	 of	
governance	 it	will	experience	strong	resistance	of	conservative	actors.	What	 it	reveals	
about	 governance	 structures	 in	 an	 exclusionary	 context	 is	 that	 rigid	 regulatory	
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mechanisms	can	be	used	to	support	a	wholly	informal	set	of	dependencies	and	pressure	
mechanisms	 reinforcing	 the	 interests	 of	 power	holders.	 The	 sustainability	 of	 people’s	
solutions	may	 truly	depend	on	 the	ability	 to	navigate	 those	 spaces.	Consequently,	 the	
way	 forward	 in	 understanding	 the	 governance	 change	 process	 in	 an	 exclusionary	
governance	 setting	 requires	 the	 adaptation	 of	 renewed	 analytical	 frameworks.	 Such	
frameworks	 should	 question	 the	 theoretical	 underpinnings	 of	 this	 process,	 based	 on	
assumptions	 largely	deriving	 from	 ‘developed’	 contexts	 (Yiftachel,	 2006;	Roy,	 2009b).	
The	 juxtaposition	 of	 institutionalisation	 vs.	 flexibility,	 conflict	 vs.	 cooperation,	 and	
control	over	the	development	process	vs.	redistribution	of	resources,	may	offer	a	useful	
analytical	 device	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	 such	 a	 process	 and	 for	 reaching	 a	 deeper	
understanding	of	the	complexities	of	the	governance	transformation	in	the	South.		
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